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Talk, and discourse in general, is becoming an important object of study 
in social sciences. This trend is part of the linguistic turn that currently is 
making its mark on social science (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000a, 2000b). 
Among other things, the linguistic turn provides new ways of thinking 
about language and language use, and their relation to social reality. Thus, 
in various disciplines, including communications studies (Deetz 1992), 
feminist studies (Hollway 1987), organization theory (Boden 1994, 
Keenoy 1997 et al, Townley 1993), and social psychology (Potter & 
Wetherell 1987, Potter 1997), scholars stress the importance of what has 
been labeled “the level of talk” (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000a, 2011a) for 
an adequate understanding of social processes. Indeed, organizational 
discourse analysis (ODA) has become one of the most important 
approaches towards understanding organizational phenomena (Alvesson 
& Kärreman 2011a, Hardy & Grant 2012) It has also ignited debate and 
even controversy (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a, 2011b, 2013, Bargiela-
Chiappini  2011, Iedema 2011, Mumby 2011, Hardy & Grant 2012). 
Generally speaking, the trend towards a more sophisticated 
understanding of the meaning of talk in social settings is a good thing. It 
undoubtedly unsettles the conventional wisdom regarding language in 
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most parts of social science―that language is complicated, philosophically 
speaking, but unproblematic, methodologically speaking. However, like 
most subversive movements in their most subversive moments, the focus 
on talk and discourse is currently more persuasive as a critique of 
conventional understandings in social science, than as a fully formed 
position for constructive research. 
It could be argued that discourse analysis―which perhaps is the most 
prominent point of view pursued from an understanding of the 
problematic nature of talk―has progressed further than “merely” function 
as a form of critique (cf. Potter & Wetherell 1987). Indeed, there is much 
promise in the various forms of discourse analysis currently available. 
There is also much confusion and hype. The confusion around the term 
“discourse” is telling regarding the difficulties to form a qualified opinion 
on what counts as a proper discourse analysis. Depending on who you 
ask, discourse can, for example, mean a) linguistic interaction, b) any form 
of talk, c) systematic exchange of utterances on a particular matter, d) 
epochal-defining historically rooted systems of ideas, e) any forms of 
texts and talk, and so on.  
The problem of the many meanings of “discourse” cannot be solved 
with better definitions. Discourse analysts are right in pointing out that 
there are good reasons why words seldom have one meaning, and that 
this rarely is a problem in everyday language use. Nevertheless, however 
helpful this argument might be to explain the confusing state of the field 
of discourse analysis, it doesn’t make it any less confusing. It should be 
clear that the only reason that the confusion around “discourse” as a 
problem is that it prevents and blocks disciplined thinking about the level 
of talk. The best, and perhaps the only, way to clarify the field of discourse 
analysis, and how it might contribute to the understanding of the level of 
talk, is to bypass the definitions of discourse. It is more important to focus 
on the core assumptions―and the analytical strategies thus enabled―that 
underlie the various meanings of the term.  
Thus, there are many strong arguments for close-up studies of talk in 
organizations. Discourse analysis provides one productive way of 
studying talk, together with, for example storytelling, narrative analysis 
and conversation analysis. In this discussion, I focus on discourse 
analysis. Put bluntly, the argument I will advance is that some forms of 
discourse analysis are more appropriate than others when studying talk 
in organizational settings. This essay attempts to demonstrate why, and 
what difference it will make. In general terms, it aims to suggest a 
framework for disciplined thought on the level of talk in organizational 
settings. It proceeds with a discussion of key dimensions in framing 
discourse in various versions of discourse analysis, and puts particular 
emphasis on how to proceed with disciplined thought on the level of talk, 
while dealing with the problem of discourse reductionism. 
Several attempts to organize the variants of discourse analysis are 
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currently available. For example, Keenoy and his co-authors (1997) 
distinguish between discourse analysis as a sense-making tool and 
discourse analysis as a revealer of ambiguity and indeterminacy. Grant 
and his co-authors (2004:3) describe organizational discourse as 
“structured collection texts embodied in the practice of talking and 
writing.” Potter (1997) identifies five versions of discourse analysis, three 
of them crafted around the project of exploring psychological dispositions 
among individuals, and two of them of perhaps greater interest in this 
context: Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) version and the standard 
Foucauldian positions. These two latter versions will be discussed in 
some detail below. 
 
Variants of discursive reductionism: small d discourse and big D 
discourse  
First, allow me to elaborate on the different takes on discourse 
analysis―henceforth shortened to DA―discussed above. I will start with 
the small d discourse approach (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000a, 2011). 
Potter and Wetherell (1987) provide a relatively pure, and well- reputed, 
version of it, which they develop from the assumption that the social 
world is created bottom-up: people create and construct the social world 
through linguistic interaction. According to Potter & Wetherell, this is a 
three-stage process: first, people actively create accounts on a basis of 
previously existing linguistic resources; second, they are continually and 
actively involved in selecting some of the infinite number of words and 
meaning constructions available, and in rejecting others; and. third, the 
chosen construction has its consequences: the mode of expression has an 
effect, it influences ideas, generates responses and so on. 
DA starts from the following: 
1. Language is used for a variety of functions and has a variety of 
consequences; 
2. Language is both constructed and constructive; 
3.  The same phenomenon can be described in several different 
ways; 
4.  Consequently there will be considerable variations in the 
accounts thereof; 
5.  There is no foolproof way yet of handling these variations, or of 
distinguishing accounts which are “literal” or “accurate” from 
those which are rhetorical or incorrect, thereby avoiding the 
problem of variation which faces researchers working with a 
more “realistic” language model; and 
6.  The constructive and flexible ways in which language is used 
should themselves be a central subject of study (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987:35). 
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Thus, from these authors’ perspective, discourse analysis means studying 
conversations, interview statements and other linguistic expressions, 
without drawing any conclusions that are clearly “beyond” the micro 
situations constituting the contexts in question. In other words, the 
conversations or the interviews themselves become the context of the 
accounts.  
In their book, Potter & Wetherell (1987) demonstrate how 
surprisingly much mileage there is in such an approach to discourse. The 
most powerful demonstration of the potency of their framework lies, 
perhaps, in their analysis of how some forms of social science does away 
with variation in its accounts. They claim that the failure of scholars to 
pay serious attention to variations in people's accounts, particularly in 
psychology, is an artifact of particular analytical strategies. These 
strategies have favored the restriction, gross categorization and selective 
interpretation of utterances. Restriction means that the scientist “locks” 
subjects by applying various techniques that force them into certain 
reaction patterns, as is the case in experiments, questionnaires and, to 
some extent, structured interviews. Gross categorization means that all 
accounts are arranged in a scheme of broader categories, which then 
operates as the primary empirical material. Thus, variation and subtle 
differences are purged from the material.  Selective interpretation means 
that a predetermined idea is function as an ordering device that privilege 
one interpretation from other, equally possible, interpretations. Again, 
variation and differences are explained away or overlooked.  
Potter & Wetherell clearly point to processes that eclipse and 
distort our understanding of discursive interaction. However, their 
approach, although legitimate, has severe limitations. Elsewhere, together 
with Mats Alvesson, I have provided a detailed critique of these 
limitations (see Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a). Allow me to summarize 
our main points. First, their exclusive focus on language use is far too 
exclusionary. For example, studying strategy from this approach means 
taking an exclusive interest in the talk and communication of strategy 
produced in particular contexts; actual strategies are defined as being out 
of the scope of analysis. Second, Potter & Wetherell’s approach seems not 
only to separate the speaker from the spoken: it seems to eliminate him 
or her. Potter & Wetherell explain utterances from their effects, by what 
arises from them, and not by the intentions or cognitive processes lying 
behind what is said or written. Third, they mystify agency. For example, it 
could be argued that their claim that contextual contingencies are more 
important in determining how the conversation is going to develop, than 
in―say―people’s psychological dispositions. The problem is that in their 
approach, almost everything―excluding (some) utterances, but including 
people’s psychological dispositions―could count as contextual 
contingencies. This also means that Potter & Wetherell are unable to 
provide a theory that tells us what’s not included in the context.  
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Big D discourse analysis draws heavily on Foucault’s ideas on the 
matter. Foucault understood discourses as bodies of knowledge, and thus 
expressions of power/knowledge-relations, “that systematically form the 
object of what they speak” (Foucault 1980:49). Discourse in the 
Foucauldian sense is less about everyday linguistic interaction, and more 
about historically developed systems of ideas that form institutionalized 
and authoritative ways of addressing a topic, to “regimes of truth.” 
Discourse in this sense not only shapes our particular ways of 
talking about a subject matter, but also shapes and constitutes our 
understanding of the real on the experiential level: it informs us of what is 
“normal,” “natural,” and “true.” Thus, both subjective and objective reality, 
in Berger & Luckmans (1967) sense, is constituted, constructed, and 
maintained through the particular discourses available in any given 
epoch. 
From an organizational analysis point of view, the perhaps biggest 
drawback with Foucauldian discourses is that they are claimed to 
constitute reality―not only in their ideational dimension, but also in their 
practical-behavioral dimension―yet without being able to spell out how 
this actually happens. In other words, the Foucauldian take on discourse 
lacks a clear idea on how it influences people to act in a prescribed way. 
On the one hand, it seems as if individuals are only embodied appendices 
of various discourses that have constituted the subjectivity the observer 
may think that s/he observes. On the other hand, Foucault empathetically 
underscored the possibility for the individual to exercise resistance, 
thereby implying the possibility of choice (cf. Foucault 1979).  
To sum up, although the mega-discourse approach provides an 
economic and elegant way of thinking on the productive and formative 
forces that shape social reality, it does so only by eliminating those who 
actually produce and form it. This is less problematic if one studies the 
history of the development of social forces―as Foucault primarily 
did―since history always starts from a perspective  already chosen by 
actors, and when their actual choices can be recorded and interpreted. 
History can be reinterpreted, but it cannot be undone. However, such 
reduction is unacceptable if one studies history in the making. Without an 
adequate understanding of those performing history―their options, their 
choices, and their ways of reaching conclusion―their actions will always 
look predetermined, if only by the fact that it is possible to construct an 
intelligible and patterned reconstruction of them. It will come to seem as 
if discourse determines this or that when, in fact, the only reason things 
looks decided from discourse is because they are assumed to be so. 
 
Does discourse analysis afford language too much agency? 
The interest in organizational communication and discourse analysis is 
fueled by the claim that communication has a significant stake in 
Journal of Business Anthropology, 3(2), Fall 2014 
 
 206 
constituting social reality. Since this claim is central for organization 
communication it seems wise to stop and think a bit about this particular 
claim: what it means and to what extent it matters. On one level, the claim 
that communication constitutes social reality is very strong. It is an 
inescapable fact that we see something as something. While the first 
something may or may not be linguistic in character, the second 
something always is. The second something, in the sense of as something, 
highlight the irreducible dimension of meaning. To make sense, reality is 
covered in layers of meaning. Thus, reality always reveals itself in a 
figurative manner. The layer of meaning is very powerful in many ways, 
but we should not be carried away. The layer of meaning is not all there 
is. Yes, it is always important, and it may in some instances be the most 
important thing or even the only thing, but this is far from always the 
case.  
When I was a Ph.D. student, one of my fellow students practised a 
running joke where he invited people to his socially constructed balcony. 
The punch-line was, of course, that his apartment lacked a balcony. (I 
didn’t say the joke was funny). Beneath the silliness of the joke lurks an 
important truth. Although all balconies obviously are socially 
constructed―after all, they hardly grow on trees―they rely on more 
things than imaginary meaning: for example, on concrete, steel or other 
materials. They also rely on performances for their actual construction: 
on welding and brick-laying and other forms of work. Arguably they 
matter more for the constitution of the balcony―in the first something 
sense―than the layer of meaning that embeds it.    
Cars, trains, bridges, houses, machines, meals―I can go on. The 
point is not that they exist independent of meanings and words. They 
clearly don’t. My point is rather that, apart from the cultural significance 
of these objects, their constitution is more a matter of matter and 
performances than of meanings and words. This is also true for certain 
less matter bound entities, such as the performance of services and 
rituals. Take for example, the cleaning of a house or a wedding. Words are 
important for understanding what cleaning is all about but the actual 
performance is likely to be performed without a word. And a wedding is 
clearly more dependent on performances of the bride, the groom, the 
officiant and whoever pays the bills, than on any words. 
Actually, let’s roll back the tape on the wedding. This is not really a 
clear type of performance (or something in the first sense) where words 
are not enough. To a certain extent words clearly are not enough. As I 
pointed out above, there is more to a wedding than words. However, 
words are doing important, if not the most important, work during this 
ceremony. A wedding is not just a party were people meet and 
congregate. It is also a mechanism for changing the social status among 
certain people.  
This change is almost exclusively done by words. It is accomplished 
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though elaborate sequences of words that are uttered by the bride, the 
groom and the officiant. Without these words a wedding would just be a 
very expensive party. With them, complex social relations are constituted 
and legitimized. The wedding is not the only ritual or performance where 
words are playing the perhaps most significant role. In getting married or 
divorced, getting hired and fired, in making war and peace, in getting 
promotion or demotion, words are making their magic and get the things 
done. They may not be the only ingredients but they are surely making a 
critical contribution in creating and constituting reality, not just by being 
an irreducible dimension but by being the actual tools or agents of change 
and creation. 
Finally, for a certain class of somethings in the first sense. meaning 
is all we have. In a way, the something in the first sense here collapses 
with the something in the second sense. Take, for example, weddings 
again: this time not the type of weddings that you and I participate in, but 
rather the pure idea of the institution as it operates in, for example, a 
particular culture. Here we are not interested in brides, grooms, and 
officiants in flesh and blood. Rather, we are interested in what they 
represent from a symbolic point of view, and how the institution of 
marriage and weddings operate in, for example, the political economy, 
shaping gendered opportunities and division of labor, and distribution of 
wealth. From this point of view, the somethings we take an interest in are 
institutions or Discourses, and, in particular, how different institutions (in 
the imaginary form) interrelate and interacts in society in general. 
These kinds of somethings exist as words only―as abstractions or 
generalities. As such they shape how we think and interact in reality in 
very thorough and ultimately powerful way. In many ways the inert and 
taken for granted character of encultured institutions tend to fool us into 
believing that they are far less fragile and malleable than they actually 
are. In this sense, the emergence of gay marriage, for example, will not 
change the actual ritual and performance much, if at all, but it will change 
cultural patterns of understandings and social relations in a profound 
way. 
The discussion above has some implications, as we already have 
hinted, on the distinction between discourses, with a small d, and 
Discourse, with a capitalized D. In cases where words are not enough, 
discourses arguably tend to be of interest from a discourse (with a small 
letter d) analysis point of view. The proper place for communication 
analysis in these cases is about the structure and content of the 
conversations that occurs around these objects and performances. 
Although we would argue that it is a stretch to think that these objects 
and performances primarily are constituted through communicative 
processes, the analysis of communicative processes embedding them 
certainly would tell us important things about how they operate in social 
reality. 
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Small d discourse analysis would also generally be helpful for 
understanding cases where words are doing the main job. In many ways, 
the value and importance of discourse analysis has been established 
through the analysis of the performative aspects of language use (see, for 
example, Potter & Wetherell 1987): when language clearly is used to 
accomplish things. In fact, I think that this is probably the area of analysis 
where small letter discourse analysis has the greatest potential, and also 
few competing analytical tools. 
Discourse analysis with a capital D, on the other hand, is eminently 
suitable for the analysis of ideational phenomena on an abstract level. As 
Foucault has demonstrated numerous times, this analytical perspective is 
powerful way of understanding the history and the sociology of ideas 
(although Foucault’s analysis of power probably is more telling regarding 
the sociology of ideas). In a way, it could be argued that the pure 
meanings of words also have performative effects, that they in fact also do 
things in the world. I think that this is correct to some extent, but I think 
the pure meaning side of words has a different type of agency in 
comparison to words that accomplish things. In the first case the agency 
lies in the framing effect of the meaning the word carries. In the second 
case, meaning is secondary, and the agency lies in actually uttering the 
words, thus connecting events rather than framing them. 
The key point of much communication and discourse studies is the 
idea that language use does not simply mirror reality out there but rather 
creates or constitutes it. As said above, this sometimes is insightful, but 
sometimes it is a less relevant or productive point. “Constitutes” covers a 
wide spectrum of various analytical options. It may be seen as the vital, 
powerful element in reality construction. “Reality”―behaviours, practices, 
meanings, talk―out there is ambiguous, “weak,” and offers only a general 
and soft input to the discourse user. It may be seen as medium-
strong―social reality (as practices) or cultural and individual mindsets 
(or deeply anchored meanings) may show considerable resistance to 
most efforts to constitute reality in specific ways, although there are some 
variations and options. Or reality may be quite robust―we may want to 
constitute knowledge society as much as we want, but most part of 
working life may put effective stoppers to do most work mainly through 
using brains and intellectual analysis.  
 
Discursive pragmatism 
It is tempting, on the basis of the critique above, to claim that the small d 
discourse and big D discourse approaches are examples of bad 
methodology. However, it is important to remember that this is only true 
in a relative sense. Whether a particular methodology is good or bad is 
not exclusively dependent on its inherent qualities. Rather, it is highly 
dependent on the particular phenomenon under study. If one wants to 
study linguistic interaction and language use among individuals, the small 
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d discourse approach will serve eminently. And although the Foucauldian 
notion of big D discourse might not quite cut it as Grand theory, 
explaining everything, it has been successful in many other respects, to 
say the least. 
In this essay, I want to propose discursive pragmatism as an 
alternative strategy to understanding organizational phenomena, 
informed by the linguistic turn. This version of discourse analysis draws 
on the idea that discourse and texts are important in their own right but 
also important as clues to extra-linguistic issues. The study of discourses 
(i.e., verbal interactions or written accounts) provides an opportunity to 
gain insight on issues more or less loosely connected to discourse. Such 
issues may include symbolic aspect of organizational realities (corporate 
culture), structural aspects of organizational work (division of labor) and 
interactive aspects of the construction and reproduction of particular 
selves (social identity). 
As hinted above, the discursive pragmatist approach builds on the 
assumption that organizational phenomena can heuristically be 
understood and studied in terms of talk, meaning and practices. I will, 
following Alvesson & Kärreman 2000a, henceforth talk about the levels of 
talk, meaning, and practice. Allow me some space to develop the specific 
character of each level, and to suggest some ideas on how to study them. 
 
The level of practice 
To study this level means to take interest in and address what people do 
and what means of employment they use to accomplish what they doing: 
the procedures, routines and practical arrangements activated by 
organizational habitants to accomplish their various tasks at hand. As 
Sandelands & Drazin (1989) have pointed out, to name the achievements 
is not enough when studying this level, since the achievements 
themselves contains no information on how they where achieved. 
Obviously, much organizational activity take place at this level, but, as 
Sandelands & Drazin points out empathically, few have paid enough 
attention to provide convincing evidence on how organizational habitants 
practically performs such key organizational phenomena as, for example, 
“decisions” and “adaptions”―if they perform them at all.  
To make convincing claims of studying the level of practice clearly 
demands some evidence of first-hand experience: participate observation 
and/or longitudinal contact with people performing the practices claimed 
to be described. Sandelands & Drazin may overestimate the possibility of 
making unambiguous observations, and the possibility of unambiguously 
communicating these observations, but they are right in their insistence 
on observational content. We might not have the means to resolve the 
different interpretations that are possible to make of the “same” 
observation but it is difficult to see why this must stop us from making 
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observations. Making facts might be a contestable business, but this does 
not prevent “facts” from being informative and, in one sense or another, 
potentially illuminating. Ultimately, the price of making contestable 
observations is a lesser burden to bear, compared to the price of not 
making observations at all. 
 
The level of talk 
We are all more or less aware of “the capacity of betrayal” in language – 
that words might tell lies, might be used incompetently and might for 
various reasons be misleading. In that sense, everybody probably agree 
that truth-claims in utterances may be problematic to a greater or lesser 
extent. Discourse analyst, however, also points out that the 
representational validity of utterances―the extent to which what is 
verbally claimed also corresponds with realities―might be the least 
interesting thing to study in regard to language use. This is so, they argue, 
not only because the validity of certain forms of speak might be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess―as it is in the case of talk on mental 
states, since our only way to find out about peoples mental states is 
through what they tell us―but also because the simpleminded focus on 
representational validity obfuscates the constructive and contextual 
character of language use.  
Proponents of a micro-discursive approach emphasize that 
language use is a worthy object of study in its own right (cf. Potter & 
Wetherell 1987). Thus the expressive modes used, the discursive moves 
deployed, and the interpretive repertoires utilized in attempts to 
construct particular realities, and to respond to various contextual 
pressures becomes the focus of investigation. At the level of talk, what 
matters is the effects created by utterances, and how various utterances 
connects to create similar effects, and not what utterances stands for. 
While it is counter-productive to constrict all organizational 
research exclusively to the level of talk, it seems quite clear that this level 
of study is all too easily overlooked in organizational analysis, although 
much less so since the arrival of organizational discourse analysis as a 
robust methodology for studying of organizational phenomena. A focus 
on discourse provides insight that facilitate and enriches reflective 
thinking on organizational phenomena in general. It also provides ideas 
that points out underdeveloped domains of research (e.g. how do 
organizational members speak in certain situations, what do they achieve 
with these forms of speak. etc), and ways and means that makes it 
possible to account for extensive study of the level of talk.  
 
The level of meaning 
The level of practice and the level of talk constitute important areas of 
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research but any study stays incomplete without the incorporation and 
consideration of the level of meaning. In one sense, the level of meaning is 
always present in any attempt to make sense of what people are doing or 
saying, since we cannot see something without seeing it as something 
(Asplund 1970, Geertz 1973). Seeing people engaged in verbal exchange 
as talking to each other already is in itself an interpretation―and this 
remains true if one chooses to see them as carrying out a particular 
practice.  
The meanings produced by researcher to make sense of the 
phenomena under investigation is but one aspect of the level of meaning. 
In the context of empirical research, the meanings produced by the people 
belonging to the field is perhaps of even greater significance. To consider 
the level of meaning means ―apart from being aware of that all 
observations to some extent also are interpretations (Geertz 1973)―to 
take interest in what people mean with expressions they are using and 
what meaning they ascribe to the practices they, and others, are 
deploying. In Geertz’s (1973) famous formulation, it means to engage in 
thick, rather than thin, descriptions: extracting, explicating, and 
translating the many layers of meaning in cultural material, hidden for the 
uninitiated. 
To study the level of meaning in terms of the discourse produced in 
the settings studied includes, for example, efforts in figuring out both 
particular meaning and more stable and invariant meaning. And in terms 
of the practices employed by the inhabitants, any serious interest in the 
level of meaning includes attempts to figure out what these practices 
mean for those who engage in them―what sense they make of them. 
Thus, both the approach advocated by Sandelands & Drazin (1989), 
and the approach suggested by Potter & Wetherell (1987) demonstrate a 
certain “thinness,” in the Geertzian sense. Extensive study of the practices 
employed in organizational settings may reveal what inhabitants actually 
are doing and how they accomplish things, at least from the researchers 
point of view. But it will provide little, if any, information on what count 
as significant practices in the setting (with the exception of what the 
researcher deem as significant) and it will say even less on what the 
practices mean to inhabitants and possible consequences thereof. 
The same is true if one exclusively sticks to the level of talk. Studies 
on the discourses deployed by inhabitants in organizational settings may 
reveal the many―or, for that matter, the few―ways people use language 
to produce certain effects. But as long as one restricts oneself to the level 
of talk, those who actually are talking becomes curiously fugitive. They 
become receiver/transmitters of discourse, language game prosumers 
stripped off any intentional capacity, engaged in games whose structure is 
clear, but whose point is not. 
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Conclusion 
This essay critiques the reductionism inherent in many version of 
discourse analysis. It proposes an alternative take: that of discursive 
pragmatism. Nevertheless, discursive pragmatism cannot escape being 
reductionist. It is, after all, unsustainable to make claims of a complete 
and exhaustive understanding of the phenomena under investigation; to 
provide the complete story.  The problem is not to exclude the “false” 
stories from the “true” ones, but to exclude unsupported or trivial stories 
from empirically grounded and telling stories. It makes much more sense, 
from this vantage point, to focus on particular situations―a meeting, an 
interaction, an event in the flow of organizational life – and elaborate its 
many facets, rather than to try to say something―almost certainly 
something thinly―on all the events, interaction and events spotted during 
fieldwork. 
This is only possible if one engages in a careful construction of the 
field work, the particular field, and the field situations, that make it 
possible to defend claims on the level of practice with observational 
evidence, claims on the level of meaning with ethnographic evidence, and 
claims on the level of talk with conversational evidence. The task is to 
construct illuminating and manageable sections of the realities at hand in 
fieldwork situation. This also makes it possible to raise defendable claims 
about actual interrelations between talk, meanings, and practices, since 
this makes it possible to ground these claims on actual empirical 
situations. This type of deep grounding enables the researcher to say 
something revealing, not only about the situation explicitly analyzed, but 
also about matters stretching out of the situation. 
Discursive pragmatism may delimit the space available for claims 
on general and broad patterns in the setting under investigation. But it is 
premature to decide whether this is a genuine difficulty with the 
approach or not. Actually, it can be argued that discursive pragmatism 
provides a better foundation for claims on general patterns than 
conventional approaches do. The empirical generalizations distilled in the 
typical case study depend on decontextualization. Starting off from 
context dependent empirical findings the researcher suddenly and 
mysteriously finds himself or herself in the decontextualized world of 
theory. Claims of general relevance in the discursive pragmatist approach 
depend rather on microanchored theory (Knorr-Cetina 1981) and on the 
inter- and intracontextual character of the findings. Discursive 
pragmatism admits for systematic comparisons within the setting where 
field work has been carried out, and thus, for example, for claims of 
findings on the level of meaning that appears to be stable across various 
contexts. 
As I pointed out above, discursive pragmatism necessarily includes 
reductionist moves. However, the reduction inherent in discursive 
pragmatism is less problematic, from an organizational analysis point of 
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view, than the reductionism in other forms of discourse analysis. This is 
because discursive pragmatism targets the levels of interaction and social 
structure. As Wiley (1988) points out, these levels are of particular 
concern from an organizational point of view. Discursive pragmatism 
relates particular talk (interaction) to particular contexts (social 
structure), and also takes an interest in how talk and meanings migrate 
between contexts. In effect discursive pragmatism take particular interest 
in the intersection between interaction and social structure, i.e. precisely 
where organizational phenomena occur (Wiley 1988). 
As a consequence, the levels of the individual and culture are less 
emphasized and visible. This is, of course, an inevitable cost, and if the 
research project aims to say something significant about individuals and 
culture per se, discursive pragmatism obviously is not an optimal choice, 
from a methodology point of view. However, individuals and culture per 
se is rarely the main focus in studies of organizational phenomena, and if 
they are, this is probably due to cognitive mistakes in the design of the 
study (i.e. denying of failing to grasp the layered “nature” of social 
reality).  
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